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The primary objective of my thesis is to provide an initial definition of what we could
call the “ungovernable novel.” I borrow the concept of the “ungovernable” from the field of
political theory, and I apply it to the theory of the novel by way of an engagement of Mikhail
Bakhtin’s and Georg Lukács’ theories of the novel. Building on this theoretical foundation, I
argue that our contemporary political imagination has reached a historical juncture: we must
abandon the dystopian framework that we have inherited from the Cold War, and we must move
in the direction of the ungovernable novel. I analyze George Orwell's Nineteen-Eighty-Four
(1949) as the quintessential text of the dystopian paradigm. The novel’s dystopic vision has
found purchase across the entire political spectrum and has shaped our vision of the future. I
argue, however, that we should seek literary examples of "ungovernability" that disorient the
ways we imagine moments of "chaos" and allow us to recognize them as experiences of
collective joy. The ungovernable novel presents us with a new task: How do we write fictions
that emerge from revolts themselves? Using Giorgio Agamben's concept of the "ungovernable," I
analyze Rachel Kushner's The Flamethrowers (2014) as a text that demonstrates some of the
possibilities of an ungovernable imagination. The ungovernable novel reaches out to its readers
from the event and allows the novel to deactivate its disciplinary role as an individualizing agent.

This operation frees the imagination, allowing the reader to come to a different understanding of
the forms that social revolt may take.
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Only Proles and Animals Are Free
They were beneath suspicion. As the party slogan put it: “Proles and animals are free.”
(Orwell, 1984, 68).
George Orwell’s most famous works are hailed as critiques of totalitarianism, fascism, and
communism (and to remaining leftist readers, of capitalism). But it is time to see these classics,
particularly Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), in a new light. Instead of reading this book as a
critique of totalitarian ideology, it would be more useful today to treat it as a landmark
registering the end of a relationship between Western literature and class struggle. From this
vantagepoint, we can begin to unpack the influence that Orwell has had on the popular political
imagination across the political spectrum.
Since the start of the Cold War, Nineteen Eighty-Four has left its mark on the Western
political imagination, even serving as an inspiration and justification for conspiracy theories.
Orwell, historically recognized as a socialist, has been a central figure for both conservative and
liberal talking points—a confluence of political interests that eventually canonized Nineteen
Eighty-Four as a definitive measuring stick for designating a political position as “totalitarian.”1
The persistence of the seemingly endless cultural references to Orwell’s novel, however, raises
several important questions: Why is there a cultural obsession with calling our own age

For more detailed studies of totalitarianism, see Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), Claude
Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society (1986), and Slavoj Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?
(2001).]
1
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“Orwellian”? And why does it feel like our imagination is always already situated in an
Orwellian framework?2
To address these questions, however, we should start by noting the simple historical fact
that today there is no organized “left” in the United States (US) in the traditional sense. There is
no labor movement or a large enough organization to create a mass movement that could exert
significant pressure on the electoral system. Thus, it is worth noting that there is no “leftist”
fiction in the US either—at least not since the proletarian novel eclipsed into the dystopian novel
during the Cold War (around the time Orwell’s works gained their notoriety). In The Naked
Communist: Cold War Modernism and the Politics of Popular Culture, Roland Végső discusses
the midcentury canonization of anti-communist fiction through a framework that allows us to
explain how Orwell’s work could simultaneously function as anti-Communist propaganda and
produce an autonomous ideology of its own:
The anti-Communist canon was constructed on the basis of a threefold division of cultural
products: at the top of the hierarchy, we find anti-communist modernism; at the bottom,
we find anti-Communist popular culture. Between these two extremes, the grand classics
of anti-Communism occupy a dubious cultural position. Due to its overtly political nature,
anti-Communist literature was always on the verge of being propaganda, so its artistic
status was always rather precarious. (105)
In other words, anti-Communist fiction such as Orwell’s could not actually achieve the
cultural status of being considered “high art” and instead functioned as a highly effective

2

News headlines often present attention-grabbing titles such as: “Paging Big Brother: In Amazon’s Bookstore,
Orwell Gets a Rewrite” or “Keeping Online Testing Honest? Or an Orwellian Overreach?” Both of these recent
articles were taken from the New York Times and are filled with Orwellian buzzwords. See
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/technology/amazon-orwell-1984.html and
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/10/us/online-testing-cheating-universities-coronavirus.html.
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ideological apparatus for the existing order. As Végső argues, the anti-Communist fiction of the
post-war era can be defined “as a fictional field of representation within which the political truth
of its own institution can only emerge in a distorted form.” In other words, according to the
dominant aesthetic ideology of the times that tried to equate the idea of “freedom” with highmodernist formal innovation, the political commitments of anti-communist fiction could not
allow it “to successfully aestheticize its politics” (107). By virtue of its explicitly stated political
commitments, anti-communist fiction was always considered to be aesthetically “flawed” as it
was always on the verge of sliding into the dubious field of “propaganda.” This inability to fully
aestheticize its politics explains why the Orwellian imagination is fundamentally closed: on the
one hand, Orwell’s imagination is closed because it sets an absolute limit to the imagination (it
claims that what escapes reason cannot be imagined); on the other hand, it is driven by the
insight that anything within the given order should be considered possible (even the worst
dystopian possibilities).
In the spirit of Végső’s critique, therefore, I would like to offer a provocative hypothesis.
Since the Cold War, we have not had a popular leftist imagination in the US, and, in turn, there
has not been a leftist novel in the US since that time—only dystopias and utopias that still
operate within fundamentally anti-leftist frameworks. When I refer to Orwell’s influence on both
“left” and “right” ideas, I am referring to the popular imagination and the way Orwell’s ideas
have been reproduced culturally. After the Cold War, Orwell’s works were taught as a warning
about the dangers of collectivism and communist ideology. Today, however, they are often
evoked as a warning about rightwing fascism or capitalist oligarchy. In other words, it does not
matter what political figure or regime is in power: Orwell’s ambiguity will fit any individualist
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narrative or any conspiracy theory. Orwell created an imaginary picture of totalitarianism that
makes one perpetually afraid of one’s own shadow.3
How can we escape Orwell today? To answer this question, we will have to start by
abandoning the paternalistic notion of “the prole” and the leftist fixation on its subjectivity to
better understand the shape of ongoing revolts in the world today. Such a theoretical shift will
also help us to challenge the individualist humanism of Orwell’s novel. In order to oppose the
cultural hegemony of this persistent Orwellianism, I will offer here the idea of the
“ungovernable,” not simply to replace the outdated leftist definition of the political subject but
also to demolish all romantic notions of a “revolutionary subject.” In other words, what I will
propose to call the “ungovernable novel” has no interest in reviving the leftist novel: instead,
such works demonstrate explosions of life trapped in representationalist political and aesthetic
frameworks as they try to break free from these externally imposed limitations. The
ungovernable novel aims to demonstrate life and not to represent political subjects. As I will try
to show throughout my argument, the possibility of this redefinition of the novel became first
visible through the theoretical tension between Georg Lukács’ and Mikhail Bakhtin’s definitions
of the novel.
The ungovernable novel emerges from a refusal of political civility, management, and
representation—refusal being the unifying gesture that is translated into the novel form. The
ungovernable novel does not fear the masses; it is the type of novel that fears the loss of the
masses through their composition into a representable body or subjectivity. As a result, in this
kind of novel, the crowd, the mass, the riot, and other similar formations give life to the story.

From the obsession of Russia meddling in the election to anti-Semitic conspiracies of global governments, the
mark of Orwell is still imprinted on every side of the political spectrum. For more examples see Dorian Lynskey,
The Ministry of Truth (2000).
3
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Rachel Kushner’s The Flamethrowers (2014) is arguably one of the finest contemporary
examples of what could be called the “ungovernable novel” in the United States thus far.
Kushner was influenced by Italian revolutionaries when she transformed what would be a
popular fiction novel into a radical text that quite intentionally connects the dots between revolt
and life.4 The novel holds the potential of becoming an event and breaking into the imagination
of the reader as it reaches out to the reader from the crowd—imploring them to arm their desires.
Thus, Kushner presents us with a novel that gives us a taste of the politics of refusal. The
Flamethrowers offers a new direction for envisioning the present and the future of political
fiction.
As crowds form across the globe to protest police brutality from Minneapolis to Nigeria,
these gestures function as expressions of collective power fueled by visions of a different way of
living. It is this inspiration that the literary imagination must continue to feed and vice versa.
Theorists of protest movements claim that a change of consciousness and the subsequent change
of behavior create the conditions for a mass revolt.5 Theorizing the ungovernable novel is my
attempt to expand this changing consciousness into the realm of the literary and to reimagine
political fiction through insurrectionary developments. How can we write about these
transformations? And how do we achieve a collective dimension to these narratives? Kushner’s
writing gives us an initial outline to begin reorienting our fictions in a new direction.
Formlessness and Content

4

Most notably, the poet, writer, and revolutionary Nanni Balestrini and his collective characters had a significant
influence on Kushner's work. We will discuss the connection between both writers later.
5
See Vicky Osterweil’s recent work In Defense of Looting: A Riotous History of Uncivil Action (2020), which does
a magnificent job of historicizing and developing a framework of the politics of riots. Joshua Clover’s Riot Strike
Riot: The New Era of Uprisings (2016) is another example of a recent development through an economic analysis of
popular uprisings; and Phil Neel’s Hinterland: America’s New Landscape of Class and Conflict (2018) offers a
nuanced perspective of current political trends across the US from a geographic study.
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Before discussing Orwell’s and Kushner’s fictional texts, I first want to lay out some definitions
and briefly explore the historical development of the novel’s form. The novel emerged as a
contested literary concept since it appeared to have no fundamental formal definition of what it
was supposed to be. Could it be its own genre, an inversion of genres, or a parody of all the
above? To make this long history short, let us turn to Georg Lukács’ The Theory of the Novel and
Mikhail Bakhtin’s works (most significantly, the four essays that would appear in the collection
The Dialogic Imagination),6 for in the tension between their works we can see the emergence of
a possible definition of the ungovernable novel. Lukács referred to the novel as something
essentially “formless.” For him, the novel had emerged after the classic Greek epic as a response
to the new historical experience of a fragmented world. Therefore, it is a degraded epic that has
lost the totality of the world. In other words, Lukács is approaching the creation of the novel as a
historic-philosophical problem when he claims that the novel form was an aesthetic response to
the problem of an ontological “homelessness.” In direct contrast to this definition, Bakhtin
acknowledges the sense of modern homelessness in the novel and celebrates it as a liberating
experience. While this opposition is a useful starting point for a definition of the ungovernable
novel, we will have to complicate these two positions by connecting them to the novel's
commodification and the crisis of democratic ideals after World War II.
On the one hand, for Lukács, the epic form was the cultural expression born of Greek
culture that told the story of man’s universal struggle and collective growth. The epic had a
philosophical dimension to it, not just in its narrative content but also in its very form. On the
other hand, the formless novel lacks a philosophical essence and is symptomatic of the alienation
caused by capitalist relations and a strictly individualized relationship to the world. Referring to

6

See the collection Theory of the Novel: A Historical Approach (2000) edited by Michael McKeon for an
impressive assortment of key texts by Mikhail Bakhtin, Ian Watt, Georg Lukács, Fredric Jameson, and many others.
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his historical moment, Lukács writes in the Theory of the Novel, “Our World has become
infinitely large, and each of its corners is richer in gifts and dangers than the world of the Greeks,
but such wealth cancels out the positive meaning—the totality—upon which their life was
based” (34). In other words, the consistency of Greek life already assumed its form, and the epic
was merely an expression of it—love, the family, the state (33). The novel was the result of the
dissolution of all these elements. The quest to find the metaphysical home that was always
already there had been replaced by what Lukács calls the “psychology of the novel's hero” (60):
the heroic individual’s search for a particular meaning (not a collective truth or home). The loss
of totality, then, is the essence of Lukács’ theorization of the novel. Even though there are some
discrepancies between Lukács’ earlier and later work that complicate this position, it is still safe
to say that he viewed the novel as a product that represents the individualist morals of the
bourgeoisie.
In his vision, therefore, the novel functioned as a way of making totality possible through
a convergence of class consciousness and history—in other words, by providing form. Yet, it
seems like this form-giving function goes against the thesis of the formlessness of the novel. As
Végső has put it, Lukács’ theory of the novel is driven by a certain anti-novelistic desire: “the
theory of the novel is simply the becoming-conscious of the internal teleology of the novel form,
which amounts to a destruction (or sublation) of the form itself” (“The World without the Novel”
75). Put differently, Lukács’ theory is another way of bringing form to the formless novel itself,
which, according to Lukács’s historical narrative, will supposedly create a new way of
formalizing historical experience that will no longer be a novel. In Lukács’s hands, the theory of
the novel becomes an obituary for the novel form.
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Bakhtin, however, provided a very different approach to the novel in response to Lukács’
nostalgia for a totality. For him, the formlessness of the novel is the cause for celebrating its
plasticity. The novel defies genres, traditions, and authoritarian literatures (Bakhtin would see
the epic to be an example of authoritarian literature). Instead of viewing metaphysical
“homelessness” as a weakness or loss, he understands it as a liberatory development. In its
earlier forms, literature reinforced an order and echoed the authority of the past. The novel has
made possible the coming together of genres, speech acts, and worlds (what he would describe as
“heteroglossia”). Authority is no longer situated in the past but in the unfinalizable present. Thus,
for Bakhtin, the epic was about the absolute past as it maintained what he calls a “hierarchal
distance” that had no relation to the present. The novel developed precisely as the breaking apart
of this hierarchy. In his classic essay “Epic and Novel,” Bakhtin states, “The novel took shape
precisely at the point when epic distance was disintegrating, when both the world and man were
assuming a degree of comic familiarity, when the object of artistic representation was being
degraded to the level of a contemporary reality that was inconclusive and fluid” (39). In other
words, the messiness of everyday life is part of the novel, and it cannot be formed into a rigid
definition or set of characteristics.
Of course, we should keep in mind that Lukács’ position on the novel was not entirely
negative as his opinions changed throughout his career. Still, he considered middle-class
morality to be an essential characteristic of the novel. This is why it is quite significant for us
that in Theory of the Novel Lukács briefly distinguishes the novel from the “entertainment”
novel. It cannot be stressed enough how important this brief aside in the essay is for
understanding the dangers of the novel. As he cautions, “The novel—unlike other genres—has a
caricatural twin almost indistinguishable from itself in all inessential characteristics: the
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entertainment novel, which has all the outward features of the novel but which, in essence, is
bound to nothing and based on nothing, i.e., is entirely meaningless” (Lukács 73). What the
problem of the entertainment novel shows, then, is that the question of form is really a tension
between form and content (or the absence of either of them). Previous more consistent literary
forms could be viewed in terms of a specific relation between a genre and a historical moment.
The novel’s formlessness, however, complicates this correlation by breaking all these
boundaries.
I argue that the ungovernable novel inhabits the cracks between the two thinkers’ literary
philosophies. While Bakhtin’s more utopian perspective is tempting, it is crucial to take Lukács’
pessimism seriously and relate it to the popular imagination. His articulation of the entertainment
novel resembles what are typically categorized as “bestsellers” today. Lukács warns that the
novel’s very formlessness makes it possible for the “empty content” of the entertainment novel
to be mistaken for the real thing. But what exactly is an empty content? The commodification
and hyper-formulation of the novel certainly could be part of the problem. But what if the real
problem is the novel’s growing inability to recognize its own historical moment by placing itself
in the non-place of individualistic mythos (Lukács 81)? The entertainment novel (or the popular
novel), then, is a fully formalized moralizing and individualizing cultural apparatus. The
ungovernable novel, on the contrary, is an apparatus cracked open to reveal ongoing social
antagonisms that exist within everyday life.

The Governed Imagination of the Popular Novel
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This difference between Lukács and Bakhtin can help us better understand the problem of
political imagination today. Consider the following contemporary example: two digital
humanities scholars, Jodie Archer and Matthew L. Jockers, designed an algorithm to analyze the
content of bestseller novels and determine if there was a formula for a true bestseller. They found
that the novels that the algorithm determined as “bestseller content” were all either series that
became branded with many different adaptations (Harry Potter, Fifty Shades of Gray, Girl with
the Dragon Tattoo) or had reached the level of at least one film adaptation (The Help, Gone Girl,
The Devil Wears Prada) (Archer & Jockers, 202-206). The purpose of bringing up this study
here is not to open a debate about the conditions of popularity but to suggest that the popular
novel itself might be driven by a desire for predictability and a propensity to surpass its own
literary form into another medium of the popular imagination, namely film. Finally, since the
popular imagination relies on formulas and tastemakers, we could describe this form of
expression in terms of a “docile imagination.” Simply put, we might be encountering here an
example of the kind of lack of content that Lukács feared in the entertainment novel: unlike the
“real” novel that tried to paradoxically formalize the historical experience of the lack of inherent
forms, the popular novel renders this historical experience invisible in a fully predetermined
form.
The problem that I want to address here concerns the instances when the political
imagination becomes determined by this popular imagination in a way that the two can no longer
be separated. Since the popular imagination has been taught to seek out formulas, so too does its
corresponding political imagination. This is how a predetermined representational framework
becomes the norm for all politics—we either need a leader or need to be the leader for everyone
else. Or, to put it differently, we seek out forms of subjectivity in the characters we read, and we
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become further subjectivized in the process. A disciplinary novel (arguably the historical
function of all novels) serves to instill a civil message, a sense of morality, and presents an
individualized narrative.7 Against Bakhtin, it could be argued that the traditional purpose of the
novel was to allow the imagination to occasionally escape but only to a pre-negotiated and
limited space that cuts it off from the ungovernable. In this sense, it was a coping mechanism
that allowed for fantasies to be explored only within the confines of predetermined limits (for
example, what Mark Fisher termed “Capitalist Realism”).8 The ungovernable novel, however,
allows the reader to experience perspectives that call from within events themselves. In the
ungovernable novel, a riot is never just happening or in the background. Instead, it is the focal
point of interest, and the narrative comes from inside of it, inviting the reader to experience the
point of view of a destituent power—a shared power that abandons the task of constitution. In a
way, the ungovernable novel teaches the reader how to become ungovernable in whatever form
that may be.
The Orwellian imagination is the political culmination of dystopias, revolutionary wars,
conspiracies, thrillers, and whatever else resurrects the same humanism and morality that the
novel has embodied from its birth. But overall, it is the product of a commodity relation, a
complete disconnection from political struggle, and a desire to be entertained. Simply stated, it is
consumerist propaganda that hides class antagonisms under individual heroism.
Let us put forward another somewhat controversial hypothesis: the popular imagination is
by default a governed imagination because it is propelled only by popular commodities and selfinterest. What this means is that the novel itself today no longer serves the cultural function it

7
8

See D.A. Miller, The Novel and the Police (1988).
See Fisher Capitalist Realism (2009).
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once did. As Lukács feared, the novel testifies today to a loss of collective purpose. The rise of
what is described as “consumer society” and the commodification of the novel into a marketable
form must be addressed to understand the intervention that the ungovernable novel makes. In
other words, we must acknowledge the “cultural industry” of the novel form as it emerged after
the 1950s to understand how the popular novelistic imagination has become driven by the
entertainment novel. Indeed, we must learn how the entertainment novel emerged from an excess
of attempts to further humanize the world and the consumer society that followed from these
attempts.
Both Lukács and Bakhtin provide us with a framework to understand the individualist
characteristics of the novel, which can in turn help us understand the prolonged debate over “the
death of the novel.” I am not suggesting that we should simply affirm the death of the novel,
because it can certainly be argued that many great novels were written after the 1950s. However,
I agree with those who claim that the cultural influence of the novel diminished after the 1950s
due to a crisis of democracy in the aftermath of fascism and technological changes. In the face of
the totalitarian threat of the 1930s, the question of morality and human agency became a popular
talking point in US literary and art circles. The individualist roots of the novel made it the ideal
cultural vehicle to reaffirm a faith in humanity that had become shaken to its very core after the
events of World War II. Mark Greif has recently argued that, in this historical context, “[t]he
novel had the obligation to humanize a fallen mankind” (104) as it was called upon to answer the
question “what is a man?” Of course, we could further speculate about the failures or successes
of these endeavors, but it is more important to consider the trajectory of this discourse. Greif
outlines this history in the following terms: “The discourse’s intellectual trajectory rose and
declined. It gained urgency in the debate over intervention, expanded once the United States
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entered the war, reached an intellectual peak by 1951, and at that point was popularized and
banalized” (14). Thus, even if we do not want to assert the actual “death of the novel,” it would
be hard to deny that by the 1960s something had changed. The push for this renewed humanism
immediately after the war aided the canonization of a nationalist reclaiming of modernist
authors. But it could also be argued that, after this mobilization of nationalist morality to reignite
a unified humanism, the mass production of literature created other complications for the social
function of the novel.
Yes, there are still novels, and many are imaginative and thought-provoking, but aesthetic
innovation plays a small role in the popular imagination. In other words, the only popular novel
is the entertainment novel; or we can even say that marketability is what gives form to the novel.
But this development emerged with the changing of the literary industry and the popularization
of various media for entertainment. As we have seen, the ultimate market trajectory for a popular
novel is arguably its film adaptation or its transformation into a franchise. While this argument
certainly announces a broad set of topics, it is important to maintain focus on the problem at
hand. The popular novel is nothing other than a blending of genres and a utilization of literary
formulas. Janice Radway, in her groundbreaking study Reading Romance: Women, Patriarchy,
and Popular Literature, tackles the popular novel and its techniques through the genre of
Romance. Looking back at what is considered the “third paper back revolution” in the 1960s,
Radway examines the trends that publishers looked for but more importantly constructed through
sales data:
Success, in effect, became a function of accurate prediction. That prediction was
ultimately dependent on the capacity to control the interaction between an identifiable
audience and a product designed especially for it. Category or formulaic literature has
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been defined most often by its standard reliance on a recipe that dictates the essential
ingredients to be included in each new version of the form. (29)
In many ways, each novel (despite its genre) is supposed to reinvent the genre, maintain
individualistic properties, and still retain the literary components that make it popular (and
profitable). The mass-produced popular novel (romance, science fiction, mystery, etc.)
essentially must fake its own particularity and difference. It is this representation of
individualization that Lukács sensed as a problem of the novel. He argued that the novel’s
formless “content could not be rationalized” (Theory of the Novel 73) and, therefore, could only
be represented as a limit of the world through the limit of the individual’s experience. This is
why there can be so many recycled stories and literary formulas that imagine different universes.
But these fictional worlds still cannot overcome the same material problems that exist in our
world—a certain historically determined threshold of morality and law cannot be surpassed by
these texts. In other words, the individualization of collective experiences produces an infinity of
the same mediocrities. Put simply, the function of the popular novel is to reinforce culturally
dominant understandings of the world and, thereby, contribute to the disappearance of class
struggle. Of course, this reaffirmation of dominant ideologies is not done intentionally by all
writers; but it is a consequence of the novel’s formlessness in the age of its mass production.
As Radway has argued in her work, the romance novel reinforces the patriarchal relations
that create a paradoxical understanding of what women perceive as “reality.” She also found that
the popular novel produced tensions between individualist “hard work” ideologies and mass
consumer culture. For example, she points out the contradiction between women’s desires to
escape some of their social responsibilities through the act of reading and the way they justify
reading as “productive” and “educational” activity: “This return to the ideology of hard work or
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productive labor to justify pleasurable leisure activity seems to betoken an incomplete
assimilation of the values of a consuming society whose very health depends on its members’
continuous purchasing of commodities” (116). She concludes the study by positing that romance
writers (or popular novel writers) try to stay away from anything that could disorient the reader’s
worldview. Instead, they tend to reinforce the reader’s sense of normality through presenting a
one-sided view of the world. She states: “The characteristic verbal structure of the contemporary
romance thus conveniently lends itself to this kind of interpretation by refusing to present the
reader with anything capable of disorienting her or of forcing her to attend differently to the
substance and organization of signs that cannot be taken so easily as simple, referential gestures”
(191).
In light of this discussion of the popular novel, then, we can now return to the
canonization of George Orwell’s fiction as the paradigmatic source of our political imagination.
As we have seen, after World War II, the popular novel reinforced the morality of liberal
humanism in response to the horrific historical events of the century such as the emergence of
totalitarianism. It was in this context that Orwell’s canonization has become a reference point for
science fiction, dystopic, young-adult, and political fictions alike. In fact, as I argued above, it is
safe to say that the Orwellian imagination is the essential political expression of the popular
novel. The commodification of the novel has thus trapped us in continuously reproduced
narratives, failed revolutions, and the inability to examine our own historical moment. Put
differently, we have collectively forgotten how literature can help us grasp the present, and
instead we have retreated into a fictional universe of what is familiar. The ungovernable novel,
however, does not seek to become a bestseller: instead, it emerges in relation to social revolts—it
aims to disrupt market relations.

16
The Prole and Orwell Today
Let us then return, then, to the questions posed in the introduction pertaining to Orwell and
Nineteen Eighty-Four. Orwell’s ideas are integral to both the kind of liberal anti-communism
that seeks to position all political discourses in the center and the rightwing legacy of anticommunism. We encounter examples of these positions daily in popular culture and media when
a CNN or Fox News pundit labels a specific phenomenon as “Orwellian” or when we pick up the
latest dystopian thriller or popular fiction novel. Orwell’s influence on popular culture has been
overwhelmingly apparent in best-selling works such as Suzanne Collin’s The Hunger Games
among others.9
The Orwellian dystopian novel is infused with a sense of elitism and rugged
individualism to such a degree that even the most modest revolutionary plot becomes
reactionary. These stories are never about a movement but rather a singular person and their
agency. Marxist literary scholar Raymond Williams also noticed this legacy on the popular
imagination. He considers Orwell’s legacy in the following terms: “The key question, however,
is what deep structures of consciousness and pressure were producing the shifts during the
thirties and forties which in Orwell’s case resulted not in an isolated major individual, but what
was to be a widely imitated style” (389). It could be argued that what made Orwell’s work so
prone to imitation was precisely that in the popular imagination it appeared to transcend
ideological critique. Yet the fact that Orwell’s work did not convey a particular ideology was
often missed by critics who tried to criticize him on a preexisting ideological basis. Williams is
correct to raise questions about the political changes taking place within not only Orwell’s career

9

The Hunger Games (novel, 2008, and film, 2012) is one of the most successful recent series that have carried on
the Orwellian tradition. However, many more titles come to mind, both in film and popular fiction, including Total
Recall (film, 1990), The Giver (novel, 1993), The Matrix (film, 1999), 1Q84 (novel, 2009), The Purge (film, 2013),
and the Divergent series (novel, 2011, and film, 2014).
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but also everywhere in the West during this time. However, I argue that Orwell’s influential role
in this universal transformation is quite significant and that the class orientation that Orwell
presents in his fictional works has resulted in the erasure of class struggle in fiction. By
proclaiming the uselessness of the proles (yet still romanticizing them), he has paved the way
toward the speculative and reactionary politics of contemporary popular fiction. As Orwell
introduces the proles in Nineteen Eighty-Four, he dismisses their way of life and erases their
power:
It was not desirable that the proles should have strong political feelings. All that
was required of them was a primitive patriotism which could be appealed to
whenever it was necessary to make them accept longer working hours or shorter
rations. And even when they became discontented, as they sometimes did, their
discontent led nowhere, because being without general ideas, they could only
focus on petty specific grievances. The larger evils invariably escaped their
notice. Even the civil police interfered with them very little. There was a vast
amount of criminality in London, a whole world-within-a-world of thieves,
bandits, prostitutes, drug peddlers, and racketeers of every description; but since it
all happened among the proles themselves, it was of no importance. … They were
beneath suspicion. As the party slogan put it: “Proles and animals are free.” (68)
The Orwellian symbolic framework is quite evident in a work like The Hunger Games:
the peacekeepers of the novel function as the “thought-police” serving a totalitarian figure
(President Snow) opposed by the conspiracy of a resistance cell (District 13). Like in Orwell’s
writing, the only narrative perspective that the reader receives is that of the protagonist. Every
event is centered around a hero or one character. But the hero must always find a place in the
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order of power and its system of reason—either to assimilate into this order or to be destroyed by
it. Whether it is Winston’s treasonous writing in Nineteen Eighty-Four or Katniss Everdeen’s
learning the secrets of the districts in The Hunger Games, there is always a moment when the
protagonists are illuminated in a way that others in the story are not. For example, at one point in
The Hunger Games, when Katniss reflects on her education, there seems to be an Orwellian
disconnection between politics and the working class:
Besides basic reading and math most of our instruction is coal-related. Except for the
weekly lecture on the history of Panem. It’s mostly just a lot of blather about what we
owe the Capitol. I know there must be more than they’re telling us, an actual account of
what happened during the rebellion. But I don’t spend much time thinking about it.
Whatever the truth is, I don’t see how it will help me get food on the table. (42)
Even this brief excerpt reads like Orwell’s descriptions of proles in Nineteen EightyFour: these characters are supposedly simple-minded, hardworking, and unaware of “truth” or
“reason.” For the Orwellian imagination, freedom and truth manifest themselves in a sense of
order and an identification with that order. As Winston famously declares in Nineteen EightyFour, “Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four” (77). Freedom must fit into
the reason of order; otherwise, it is unintelligible and therefore without power, as is the case with
the proles. Of course, in The Hunger Games Katniss eventually learns the “truth” and finds
herself in a position of leadership as she becomes the representative of others’ struggles.
Representation is important to recognize here because it demonstrates that Katniss has found a
place in the order (even if she intends to disrupt it) and, therefore, she now has political agency
in a way that others do not. During a rebellion in the second book, the balance of order falls into
her hands. The districts erupt into a revolt. The event is described as a scene of “chaos” that
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Katniss manages to instigate all on her own. In the end, however, the proletarian uprising fails as
it leads to death and violence. The story presents us only gruesome details without descriptions
of strength from the crowd itself.
Collins’ work, therefore, falls into the old Orwellian trap.10 It is this individualisthumanist representation that reproduces the heroism and individualism of the popular novel that
Lukács theorized long ago. In effect, Orwell made it impossible for us to identify with the proles
and instead reoriented the popular imagination around a compulsory political identification with
order and whoever maintains it. Once again, the popular imagination and the political
imagination become inseparable, and the rugged individualism of the popular novel determines
what is politically imaginable—no collective struggles, no solidarities, just an inherited sense of
loneliness.
Why is a mass uprising described as “chaos?” Why is Katniss a pivotal figure for a
people’s insurrection? And why does the event (in this case the riot) never escape a single
unified perspective? Is it truly so impossible in popular fiction to imagine what happens after the
crowd storms the Capital?11 On a symptomatic level, this very notion explains why so many
Americans could not grasp a national, Black-led, multi-racial uprising against anti-Black police

Franco “Bifo” Berardi also makes a similar observation about the Hunger Games film in his book Futurability:
The Age of Impotence and the Horizon of Possibility (2017). He states, “In the film, there is, finally, a rebellion that
occurs, but it is something sad and hopeless, whose outcome contradicts any idea of possible solidarity among the
oppressed” (45).
11
The recent event known as the Washington D.C. Capitol “insurrection” on January 6 th, 2021 demonstrates this
lack of imagination. Once the crowd was inside the halls of power, they mostly just wandered and sat in empty
chairs waiting for their monarch to lead them to the next step of the “revolution.” There they were: multiple
generations of those following the Orwellian imagination who participated in the “seizing” of the Capitol. A perfect
example of the political outcomes of governed imaginations, this was not an insurrection but an attempt of imposing
the same white supremacist order, an effort perfectly compatible with the practices of American democracy and
imperialism.
10
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violence in response to George Floyd’s murder by Minneapolis police in the summer of 2020.12
One possible answer is that US popular political fiction could not aestheticize such a vision of
politics as it is an impossibility for the market-based form of the popular novel because it escapes
the bestseller formula. Instead, authors of such fiction rely on either conspiracy theories
encompassing every side of the political spectrum or a blind pessimism. Conspiracy theories
might appear to lack rationality, but they have just the right amount of reason in them to appeal
to a specific flaw in a system or a social contradiction.13 However, because they only exist within
specific pre-established power relations, they are not subversive in relation to the general order
itself, only in relation to specific figures within the order. They also play into the mass paranoia
of a politically impotent population. Since conspiracy theories function as ideologies that
misrepresent real historical conditions, despite the fantastic elements they might contain, in
reality they merely reinforce current order. This is what I mean by the Orwellian imagination.
There are practically no popular novels that give us the crowd’s perspective or any politically
imaginative stories that inspire anything other than consumerism, representative politics, or
empty signifiers of individual “bravery.”14 Again, all we get is the same reaffirmation of order
and the norms for everyday life. In these worlds, “truth” is discovered only through the
individual’s heroic journey (the psychology of the hero, as Lukács puts it) and his or her ability
to lead others, but never through a shared struggle. The dystopias inspired by Orwell’s works
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present us lonely existences that seem to reflect the readers’ worlds. If this mirror is correct, then
nothing can change, and we must continue waiting for the next brave individual inside of Plato’s
cave to discover the truth for everyone and lead us. Thankfully, a house of mirrors can be
broken. But again, this reflection could also be the limit of the individualization inherent in the
formlessness of the novel even if it is crucial to recognize that the Orwellian imagination
politicizes these limitations. First, we must reckon with Orwell’s legacy in literature, and we
must confront the limitations that it places on our ideas of what politics means—eventually
raising the question of what a life outside of politics could mean to us.
One way of considering our current predicament would be to argue that the Orwellian
imagination has kept us in the Cold War. It offers us a bourgeois dystopia that seems almost
inescapable. But abandoning Orwell is not an ideological position. Rather, it is the recognition
that the foundations of the Orwellian imagination are rooted in epistemological errors: at best,
Orwell merely reaches a point of paradox in his political analyses due to his limited
understanding of how states function; at worst, he is a totalitarian in denial. Both options could
be true, and they present us even more reason to break down the Orwellian wall that blocks the
flow of our political actions. What we lack is a common understanding of what is “possible”
today. Our task is tumultuous in this sense. As uprisings continue to spread across the globe, we
must develop new ways to understand them and place ourselves inside of them. Fiction as an art
opens new life for us, and it gives us new vision. Neither utopian nor dystopian, the
ungovernable novel is concerned with living revolt and the historical time of now.
Escaping Orwell
Nineteen Eighty-Four is an expression of Orwell’s own totalitarian tendencies, emerging from
his personal conflicts with the left and his commitment to English patriotism and British law.
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Orwell’s authoritarianism explains why Nineteen Eighty-Four remains a paradoxical work of
literature that provides us a reason to abandon the Orwellian imagination for good. Numerous
critics have observed that Orwell’s ideological ambiguities and humanist tendencies make
Nineteen Eighty-Four a perplexing novel that ultimately provides no coherent politics. Although
the contradictory tendencies of Orwell’s writings have been noted before, continuing to critically
engage his text is pertinent to our current political climate. However, we must note that earlier
critics of Orwell often failed to read Orwell against Orwell. Instead, they focused on formal
questions or presented counter-ideological arguments.15 I argue instead that reading Orwell
against himself is the current task of Orwell criticism.
An archaeological approach to Orwell’s writings reveals why Nineteen Eighty-Four is
simultaneously consistent and in conflict with Orwell’s other political works. In this space of
discrepancy, his fictional concepts produce an ideology that can prop up both reactionary and
progressive political positions—which explains why Orwell can simultaneously be read as a
conservative and socialist figure; why approaching Orwell criticism through an opposing
ideology is ultimately ineffectual; and why the only possible politics that can be derived from
such a confusing framework are conspiracy theories and a defense of the existing order.
Ultimately, there is no political imagination to be found in Orwell’s world, only fear and
paranoia.
Orwell never overcame the orthodoxies of his patriotism (even though he had proclaimed
the importance of rejecting ideological orthodoxies), as is evidenced by his shorter political
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essays such as “The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius” (1941) and the
later work “Writers and Leviathan” (1948). Several critics have noted that the conflicts of
Orwell’s political imagination are clearly legible in these texts.16 A sense of order permeates
these texts. Consider, for example, the way Orwell’s commitment to what he calls “the inherent
gentleness of the English civilization” (“The Lion” 17) clashes significantly with his fictional
depictions of a totalitarian state. A totalitarian state depends precisely upon the perception that it
is inherently good since it embodies the natural order—the paradox is quite visible here. Yet, it is
also clear that Orwell’s fear of totalitarianism is based on his distrust of other countries and his
xenophobia—he simply does not believe that English culture could ever lead to a form of
totalitarianism. “Patriotism is usually stronger than class-hatred,” Orwell writes, “and always
stronger than any kind of internationalism” (“The Lion” 24). This position is the logical
foundation for Orwell’s understanding of a patriotic democratic socialism. He acknowledges
class antagonism but chooses to believe that patriotism is a stronger glue for unity.
Orwell is not entirely wrong. However, history has proven that this glue also leaves
behind the poisonous residue of nationalism.17 It makes one wonder how dismayed Orwell might
have been if he had lived to see the results of his logic at play in the 2020 Brexit decision. Yet,
what is most telling in “The Lion and the Unicorn” is Orwell’s attack on the left and his
disillusionment with the proletariat that he still valorizes in earlier pages of the essay. He accuses
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leftist intellectuals of “frightening away” the proletariat with propaganda that taints the idea of a
socialist society. To Orwell, the proles are obedient to English law and order, and they are too
good to revolt violently. Just like his fictional character O’Brian tells us in Nineteen Eighty-Four,
Orwell believes that the proles will not revolt:
A socialist party, which genuinely wished to achieve anything, would have started by
facing several facts, which to this day are considered unmentionable in left-wing circles. It
would have recognized that England is more united than most countries, that the British
workers have a great deal to lose besides their chains, and that the differences in outlook
and habits between class and class are rapidly diminishing. In general, it would have
recognized that the old-fashioned proletarian revolution is an impossibility. (69)
Orwell’s socialist revolution was to be achieved through the English state apparatus, and
it was supposed to set a precedent for other countries to develop their own socialist nations. But
what does revolution look like if you have no faith in the working class? Orwell certainly was no
materialist dialectician either, as he rejected Marxism. However, it is possible that the fictional
concept of “newspeak” was his critical response to the continuous revisions of dialectical
materialism (as demonstrated by Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, etc.).18 Regardless, Orwell’s arguments
still position him in a role of authority in a symmetrical conflict between what he perceived as
individual freedom and collective tyranny. This fantasy blocks his ability to see beyond not only
ideologies he opposes but also the ones he follows. Yet, this blindness exacerbates a tension
between individual autonomy and the processes of subjectivation (meaning a nation must create
its subjects to be governed). Patriotism and revolution, then, achieve contrary outcomes.
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Orwell’s vision of socialism molds the revolution into the framework of the nation and the
subject into the citizen.
The symmetrical analysis of revolution that Orwell follows places revolution in a context
that totalizes subjects, space, and time.19 In other words, Orwell’s politics leave no room for
nuance, transformation, and most importantly, escape from fixities. Perhaps Orwell’s hypocrisies
are most prevalent when he is trying to defend his earlier positions while also proclaiming their
errors, so that he does not lose a particular argument—Orwell is truly the master of doublespeak.
Nineteen Eighty-Four, then, can be understood as an expression of Orwell’s
authoritarianism in denial. Winston and O’Brian can be seen as representing the two opposing
ideological positions that characterize Orwell’s own thinking. The once socialist Orwell
(Winston) and the authoritarian Orwell (O’Brian) face off against each other during Winston’s
torture sessions in the Ministry of Love. At one point, O’Brian proclaims: “In our world there
will be no emotions except, fear, rage, triumph, and self-abasement. Everything else we shall
destroy—everything” (256). O’Brian’s words demonstrate not only Orwell’s loss of faith in a
socialist revolution but also the transformation of Orwell’s concepts from “The Lion and the
Unicorn” into a purely negative expression of themselves represented through the Party.
In Orwell’s anti-communist imagination, every move of the Party is calculated to gain
power and to manipulate the population to serve the totalitarian state. But Orwell writes in “The
Lion and the Unicorn”: “The totalitarian idea that there is no such thing as law, there is only
power, has never taken root” (21). Orwell seems to have abandoned this belief by creating the
universe of Nineteen Eighty-Four and by wedding a fiction of communism to a perpetual search

Kieran Aarons distinguishes between symmetrical revolution and asymmetrical revolt with reference to the late
Italian philosopher Furio Jesi’s understanding of revolts as “moments of suspended historical time.” See
"Symposium Introduction: Myth and Politics in Furio Jesi," Theory & Event, vol. 22 no. 4, 2019.
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for power. It could be argued, then, that Orwell’s last novel represents the death of the socialist
Orwell. His socialism was eclipsed by his totalitarian imagination, as he theorized a state
apparatus of pure terror. The terror for Orwell was always the loss of the law.
Yet, it is Orwell who dreams up what would become a never-ending nightmare.
Everywhere we look, we find the specter of totalitarianism and conspiracy—the apparition of
Big Brother. Although according to Orwell himself it cannot ever come fully into existence, the
world of Nineteen Eighty-Four nevertheless keeps haunting our political imagination.
Throughout the novel, Orwell grappled with and destroyed whatever faith in the proletariat (and
in turn the socialist revolution) had lingered in his heart. Yet, he could not resist the compulsion
to continue romanticizing the working class (as a revolutionary subject). Winston proclaims: “If
there was hope it must lie in the proles.” But Orwell quickly negates this statement with
O’Brian’s words: “The proletarians will never revolt, not in a thousand years or a million. They
cannot. I do not have to tell you the reason; you know it already” (251). Let us not ignore the
presupposition to which Orwell gives voice through O’Brian.
Orwell expressed in “The Lion and the Unicorn” his belief that the proles are too good to
break the law and that violent insurrection will not be how the English working class would
come to power. For Orwell, nothing exists outside the law, just as for O’Brian nothing exists
outside the Party. In a way, both Winston and O’Brian are correct. The proles, in Orwell’s mind,
represent the hopes of English decency. As a result, they will not revolt because they will not
break the law. But this is not true: there is no law in the Prole’s city. So, what Orwell really
means is that they will not disobey the Party, which Orwell defines in his fictional universe as
the rule of law. The paradox he has created is twofold: Orwell despises the ungovernable way of
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life that proles inhabit, and he wants to save them from it; but he also romanticizes their simple
way of life and cannot let go of hopes that they become conscious.
A Problem with the Revolutionary Subject
We must understand that Orwell’s political imagination exists as a vacuous force of totality, and
it relies on anticipations of rigid categorizations of life. The continual flows of power do not
register in his political analysis, nor does any kind of productive spontaneity, and this is where
the shallowness of his humanism and bourgeois individualism reveals itself. Second, it is crucial
to keep in mind while interrogating his texts that Orwell is a product of his historical moment. At
the heart of his politics we can find the familiar desire to identify a revolutionary subject—his
aforementioned fetishization of the proles. Orwell was not alone in this obsession, as it has not
disappeared from political discourse even today. The problem we need to address here is that the
very notion of a revolutionary subject individualizes shared communal struggles, imposes
identity, and limits the scope of what is possible for various forms of life. Moreover, with the
formlessness of the novel and the tendency of anti-communist fiction toward propaganda,
collective struggle is cast aside in favor of a conspiracy against the hero.
Both issues (the reduction of life to rigid categories and the obsession with the
revolutionary subject) have been addressed by political theorists since Orwell’s times. In the
French Marxist tradition (beginning with Louis Althusser), we can easily identify the
groundworks of a theory that sought to think beyond notions of the subject by creating a more
fluid ontology that broke with some of the metaphysical rigidness of classic Marxism. Althusser
famously quipped, “If we never were structuralists, we can now explain why: why we seemed to
be, even though we were not, why there came about this strange misunderstanding on the basis
of which books were written. We were guilty of an equally powerful and compromising passion:
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we were Spinozists” (Essays in Self Criticism 132). It was this impulse that opened the flow of
the Spinozan current into post-Marxism.
Etienne Balibar, a French Marxist theorist and student of Althusser, continued the postMarxist/Spinoza connection in an essay titled “Spinoza, the Anti-Orwell: Fear of the Masses.”
Using a Spinozist framework, Balibar declares that the world invented by Orwell is ontologically
impossible. Balibar presents Spinoza’s philosophy of the masses (multitude), language, and
ethics as an example of a new political framework. In Spinozan ethics, all language, ideas, and
actions are practiced collectively. In other words, no idea or action exists in a vacuum. Balibar
quotes Spinoza: “Neither the Cartesian nor empiricist ‘subject,’ but the process or the network of
the circulation of affects and ideas” (Balibar 33). Drawing from a Spinozan framework, Balibar
states, “By showing that individuality and the multitude are inseparable,” he continues, “Spinoza
shows also in advance the absurdity of theories of ‘totalitarianism,’ which see in mass
movements only the figure of a radical historical evil” (37).
According to such a view, the interconnectivity among all forms of life, comprising all
movement and thought, cannot fall into absolute control of a state apparatus. Orwell’s world
cannot exist, as language, thought, and action will always play freely (even under repression).
While it is not possible to summarize the entire French post-Marxist (or Italian Marxist) schools
of thought that embraced Spinoza in this essay, this philosophical lineage clearly established an
anti-Orwellian contemporary discourse that goes against the notion of the subject.20
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But it is beyond this Althusserian Spinozist lineage that we arrive at the idea of the
ungovernable. The word ungovernable resists the Orwellian imagination; as such, it can help us
move away from this tradition. Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s work has been
instrumental in developing useful ways of understanding ongoing revolts with what he refers to
as a “destituent potential.”21
Deactivating the Novel as Apparatus
Orwell’s fictions work against revealing the ungovernable, and they are ontologically opposed to
revolution because of the force of law that Orwell defends. In other words, a different literary
relationship between mythos and revolt needs to be established, and stories that create tensions
between definitions of order and chaos must begin to fill our imaginations. The task at hand is to
reorient our vision to the chaos of the event—namely, the riot.
To begin, the ungovernable is a form of life and not a subject position. Agamben first
introduced this term in his short essay “What is an Apparatus?” (2009) where he expands the
scope of Michel Foucault’s biopolitical concept of the apparatus (dispositif) into all areas of life.
An apparatus captures what he calls “forms-of life.” Agamben writes: “The problem of the
profanation of apparatuses—that is to say, the restitution to common use of what has been
captured and separated in them—is, for this reason, all the more urgent.” He continues, “But this
problem cannot be properly raised as long as those who are concerned with it are unable to
intervene in their own processes of subjectification, any more than in their own apparatuses”

For example, the French collective The Invisible Committee has written at length about a destituent power visible
in contemporary revolts. See: The Invisible Committee, To Our Friends (2014), and The Invisible Committee, Now
(2018). Italian philosopher Marcello Tarì also has a forthcoming book in translation titled There is No Unhappy
Revolution: The Communism of Destituion that focuses on the concept. An emerging field of destituent studies is
also beginning to grow in popularity. See the following website: https://destituentcommons.com/
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(24). It is here that he makes the claim that the ungovernable emerges as the “beginning and, at
the same time, the vanishing point of every politics” (24).
Agamben’s philosophical gesture urges us to intervene in our own processes of
subjectification. This means that we must work to reject whatever seeks to interpellate us or
manage our bodies into a codifiable system in order to free us from the multiplicity of
apparatuses in our lives. What is ungovernable is the coming together of the forms of life that are
made visible only through gestures and affections (not one shared identity or explained feeling).
In other words, ungovernability is precisely the shared loss of what existed before the naming of
our identities. It is what becomes possible when life is freed from the apparatus of subjectivity.
What does this mean? On the one hand, there is a need to liberate life from domination, which is
a typical response to systemic forms of oppression (in line with previous post-Marxist thought).
On the other hand, all forms of subjectivity function as forms of capture. To be ungovernable
means to flee subjectivity, to resist forming bonds embedded in subject positions, and to build
relationships that destroy the sociality of power. It consists of undoing the work that power has
done to impose itself on all bodies and finding ways to evade power’s influence on naming the
subject itself (the naming of a revolutionary subject falls into this trap). What pushes Agamben’s
philosophy beyond the limitations of the post-Marxist position is the notion of the active selfdeconstruction of each form of subjectivity. The “profanation of apparatuses” amounts to
breaking them apart in order to liberate the potentials that remained inactive in them, thereby
allowing for a different use of what was trapped in these apparatuses (Use of Bodies 273). In
other words, the forms of life or singularities are ontologically transformed and given the ability
to exist freely as what he calls “whatever singularities” or sometimes referred to as “universal
singularities.”
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With these ideas in mind, in conversation with Agamben’s philosophy, it is now possible
to approach the idea of communism in a way that was not possible for Orwell. In this new sense,
communism could be defined as life in common, where the concept of community is not bound
to an economic system (be it capitalist or communist). Neither a state apparatus nor an economic
system, communism is the proliferation of autonomous forms of shared life based on the
rejection of any management. It is this vision of a life in common that allows us to provide an
ontological definition of the ungovernable. We are also inhabiting a tension between both
Bakhtin and Lukács because there is a being homeless together that “becoming ungovernable”
implies. But, at this point, a new question emerges: How can insurrections create ungovernable
bodies? Before this question can be answered, first we must understand some identifiable
characteristics of ungovernability in both global revolt and literature.
The ungovernable are present in every class and exist to betray every class form. They
become visible in the “Be water” slogan of Hong Kong rebels, the occupations of roundabouts in
Paris by the Yellow Vests, and the subway fare evaders in Chile—together they form a global
force that rejects the centralization of power. In other words, the ungovernable are precisely
everything that Orwell could not imagine in the proles—a multiplicity of different singularities.
To “become ungovernable,” therefore, is a gesture that is replicated and multiplied as
each revolt erupts autonomously but in relation to a shared uncontrollability. The term “gesture”
implies an idea or ethic communicated through physical movements. Agamben writes, “The
gesture is, in this sense, communication of a communicability. It has nothing to say because what
it shows is the being-in-language of human beings as pure mediality” (Means without End 58-9).
A gesture shows all and tells nothing. It is the form of life that emerges in revolt and in daily life
when antagonism is revealed.
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We cannot all be present for the riot, but we must understand its composition and its
gestures as a culture if we are to see revolutionary movements develop further. Agamben’s
philosophy helps us to reorient our perceptions to what we have been told is “chaos” and to see
instead the beauty of multiplicities coming together against order that keeps them in subjectivity.
Therefore, an ungovernable novel is the medium that allows an escape from pure individualist
representation that introduces a multiplicity of voices through its narrative. This is the exact
opposite of the Orwellian novel and its governable imagination born within the individualist
nature of the novel itself. To gesture back to Bakhtin and Lukács, there is a formlessness but also
a collective consciousness that the ungovernable novel demonstrates—being homeless together
but sharing this realization. As I argued earlier, Rachel Kushner’s novel The Flamethrowers is a
rich text that demonstrates this point quite clearly.
Kushner, Crowds, and Riots
The Flamethrowers encapsulates the central ideas (the refusal of work, political representation,
social management, and civility) that were characteristic of the Italian revolutionary moment
known as “Autonomia, 1977.” However, these elements are also mirrored through Kushner’s
fictional narrative in a way that overcomes the solitary confinement of traditional novels. What
do I mean by this? The key ungovernable element of Kushner’s collective narrative is what many
have condemned as its “silent narrator.” Many critics have frowned upon this narrative device
and have claimed it has taken agency away from the protagonist (Kushner intentionally never
fully identified the narrator who is nicknamed “Reno”).22 She (Reno) has her own thoughts, but
she does not take the center stage in the narrative.
Most of Kushner’s critics in the United States could not see past both the “silent narrator” or the romance between
characters, and the political potential of the novel has largely been misunderstood. See
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/books/review/rachel-kushners-flamethrowers.html,
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/jun/23/flamethrowers-rachel-kushner-review, and
22
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In an interview with The Believer, Kushner responds to this criticism of her work when
she pushes back against the charge that Reno’s character has no “agency”: “Sure—maybe it’ll be
the case that some people will be disappointed by her so-called lack of agency, and my rebuttal
would be that maybe those peoples’ expectations have to do with literary conventions of heroism
more than with real life situations that young women face” (2). Kushner is obviously working
against the gendered individualist-humanist formula of the popular novel. The ungovernable
novel works against becoming stuck in fixed forms of representation (or formulas) that
reproduce the same individualist narrative that the Orwellian imagination champions.
Furthermore, I also argue that the narrative in Kushner’s writing should not be our primary
focus. Most of the mainstream reception of Kushner’s novel focused on the romantic plot
elements as well as the motifs related to what we could call the novel’s motorcycle and racing
aesthetics.23 All of these are elements of the popular novel, and I argue that we are missing
something important by focusing too much on these narrative devices. Instead, it is the
depictions of various moments of social rupture that make The Flamethrowers an ungovernable
novel.24 The Event is always a matter of corporeal rupture, whether through language or reality.
In Kushner’s work, the riot is the rupture. It is where all shared affectivity erupts either in flows
of bodies or in streams of memories and concepts.

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/04/08/youth-in-revolt.
23
See Christina García, “Revolutions Per Minute, Rachel Kushner’s Flamethrowers,” New York Times (2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/books/review/rachel-kushners-flamethrowers.html; and Maud Newton,
“Racing From Art To Revolution And Back Again In 'The Flamethrowers’,” NPR (2013),
https://www.npr.org/2013/04/04/175351776/racing-from-art-to-revolution-and-back-again-in-the-flamethrowers.
24

Literary scholars have not explored this aspect of Kushner’s novel. I chose The Flamethrowers as an example of
the ungovernable for this reason. There is potential in the novel to reimagine what becomes possible in moments of
revolt and how on a sensorial level to engage with such experiences. The examples of rioting in Rome and New
York City in the book demonstrate how we can begin to reimagine a living politics.
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Up to chapter fifteen, Reno floats between groups and people and relationships
established through her status as an individual. Reno is immersed in the New York art scene of
the 1970s as she is exposed to the life of the extremely wealthy Valera family. A few chapters
take place in a different timeline in the voice of Ettore Valera, Sandro’s grandfather. Those
chapters create a context for the overall Italian history and the Valera family’s class status as
well as their historical association with fascism. But the composition of groups in the story
changes after she breaks off her relationship with Sandro and leaves the Valera family behind
while visiting Italy.
Reno finds herself with Gianni (the Valera family’s gardener) and is thrust into Italy’s
Autonomia moment of 1977. It is at this point that we can begin our analysis of the way
Kushner’s writing presents us with an example of the ungovernable novel. In the follow passage,
Reno finds herself in a random apartment with some young people who she learns are involved
in the movement. Reno observes the scene: “The people in the apartment had been kind to me
the previous night. There was something about them I could only describe as human. Humane.
They didn’t ask who I was or why I was there, where I came from, what I did. One didn’t present
credentials with these people, like in New York” (270). Immediately, in this chapter Reno starts
to ponder questions about space and bodies. She had passively listened to guests at dinner parties
and kept her thoughts to herself. But in contrast to the Valera family (with whom she had just
spent extended time), these young revolutionaries present her with a different view of the world.
The following day a demonstration takes place. This scene shows exactly how Kushner
imagines the presence of crowds. Up to this point in the novel, Reno’s “silence” has allowed a
multiplicity of voices to speak. Moreover, most of the dialogue in The Flamethrowers takes
place in bars and art galleries, at dinner parties, and of course during riots. This is a significant

35
detail because those are all shared spaces, where every character’s voice is channeled through
Reno for narrative purposes. However, at the riot we see a politics of whatever singularities
emerge—we are given a taste of the ungovernable.
In her mind, Reno repeatedly asks, “how do we find each other?” as more people begin to
fill space in the square, and suddenly her world is reoriented: “the world was people, which made
the prospect of two finding each other more desolate” (277). The scene’s tension grows as
various groups arrive, and the carabinieri (police) begin to escalate things. The riot has not
revealed itself as the event yet, but its anticipation underwrites each line.
Kushner puts us into the riot, but not in the way the Orwellian imagination would.
Instead, we can negotiate ourselves into its fabric, as Reno does with the feminist contingent of
the march. Reno, still distraught by how her relationship with Sandro had ended, begins to
recount all the moments men had manipulated her and pieces together all the inconsistencies.
Finally, while being pushed into the crowd, she has an epiphany: “Watching these women with
their bullhorns shouting, ‘You’ll pay for everything!’, I took their rage and negotiated myself
into its fabric. I fused my sadness over something private to the chorus of their public lament”
(279). This is an example of how Kushner breaks open the apparatus of the novel and allows new
life to proliferate. This moment demonstrates what is possible when the separation between the
“public” and “private” becomes ruptured and new possibilities emerge that bring our struggles
together. It is very fitting that this is the moment when the riot erupts. In his book Hinterland:
America’s New Landscape of Class and Conflict, Phil Neel describes this moment in the
following terms: “Anyone who has been in such a crowd can feel the power there, the strange
new logics that emerge when so many bodies are pushed together against the police and the
absolutely terrifying multiplication of violence made possible in such moments” (12). In
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Kushner’s novel, these potentialities are demonstrated as the crowd begins picking up pace and
pushing past lines of carabinieri.
On the surface, Kushner describes a scene of “chaos” as a bus is flipped and set on fire
and college students begin pulling up paving stones and throwing them (280). Yet, there is
something very different happening here from what the Orwellian imagination is used to.
Kushner reorients our imagination from chaos to joy. As the windows of expensive boutiques are
methodically smashed, looting begins—but the experience is not scary for Reno:
I heard the crash of breaking glass, “Expropriate! Expropriate!” Three kids with painted
faces came running past clutching fur coats, the war paint on their cheeks dripping down,
sweat and rain smeared stacks of furs over their arms like midtown Manhattan coat-check
clerks. “Furs for the people!” Plastic hangers dropping behind them as they ran. (280)
The playfulness in this scene continues as Reno recalls a conversation with an eight-yearold Italian boy about how Moka bombs made from espresso makers were “easier to run with”
instead of normal Molotov cocktails (281). All ages, genders, and races are throwing incendiary
devices, building barricades, breaking windows, and looting. Everyone works together, and,
suddenly, the disciplinary mode of the novel is deactivated—the novel as apparatus is no more
and instead a free play of forms of life becomes possible. This is the anti-Orwellian gesture. It is
this gesture that allows Kushner to communicate the anti-work, anti-police, and antimanagement message of the ungovernability of Italian Autonomia. Bodies were free, space was
free, and things were free. Kushner writes her work in a way that destitutes the disciplinary
apparatus that a popular novel becomes—a mouthpiece for social morality. Instead, the story
demonstrates how the city can be inhabited differently together.
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Moreover, what separates the social rupture from the narrative is the latter’s ability to
become more than just a story. Instead, it is the rupture that takes place in both the story and the
reader that turns the novel into a source of destituent potential. What is being learned? And how
will the reader expand their own ideas for rebellion? In other words, how will the novel’s events
attach themselves to life and material conditions? The imagination breaks the barrier of the prenegotiated space that Orwellian concepts have propped up. The narratives continue with the
characters changed by the event and the reader continues with a rupture introduced into their
perception of things. Ilai Rowner has argued that for the corporeality of a literary event to be
understood, there must be a “vital move.” I would like to posit that this is precisely what
Kushner is doing with her novel. Rowner, drawing on Gilles Deleuze’s idea of immanence,
writes:
First, one has to convert the discursive signs that appear to constitute the activity of
man’s reading and writing into a map of corporeal entities and relations. Second, through
these quantitative corporeal measures, one has to take the risk of approaching the work’s
qualitative becoming (the virtual of the actual, the incorporeal of the corporeal). Finally
one has to experience the immense stream of life through the text, with the purpose of
recognizing the work’s law of transformation, the work’s engagement in the future
offspring of the event. Such a reading promises a mythology of happenings, events that
have already occurred and yet are still to come. (196)
For Deleuze (and Rowner), immanence means that the text influences the body, and the body
influences the text—there is no inside or outside, only a field of immanence. Deleuze’s theory of
the event emphasizes that language is the event. Kushner has achieved this with her novel by
placing herself in suspended time between her historical moment and the event of ‘77 Italy. The
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Flamethrowers offers a force of thought to the reader: “it is both the force that affects and that is
affected” (Zourabichvili 70). In other words, Kushner offers a framework for writing the fiction
of revolt and future revolts that takes the formlessness of the novel and puts it into a messianic
historic relation—the past, present, and future of revolts are situated in the imagination of now.
Paradoxically, the promise of future revolutions, societies, and technologies still reeks of
the Orwellian mindset. Kushner teaches us to avoid this paradox by drawing inspiration from
what has happened or what is happening (or by linking two events together). Kushner is taking
the novel, drawing a line of continuity between previous and ongoing revolts, and writing ideas
that interact with potentialities of the body. The bodily relationship to the text is crucial. To
return to Orwell one last time, let us experiment with the destituent potential that is found in
Nineteen Eighty-Four. Early in the story, Winston has a dream about Julia:
What overwhelmed him in that instant was admiration for the gesture with which she had
thrown her clothes aside. With its grace and carelessness it seemed to annihilate a whole
culture, a whole system of thought, as through Big Brother and the Party and the Thought
Police could all be swept into nothingness by a single splendid movement of the arm.
(30)
This is arguably the most ungovernable moment in the novel. Julia’s gesture had the potential to
be replicated into more rebellions, if only Orwell had acknowledged the opportunity. While the
ungovernable cannot be reduced to one single bodily formation, it is always bodily gestures that
reveal it. Such gestures could be a riot, or Julia’s gesture of throwing off her clothes in Orwell’s
case. Julia’s character also demonstrates what Fred Moten and Stefano Harney have termed “the
Undercommons.” She uses her position to steal or purchase illegal and forbidden items (although
we find that Orwell did not see freedom beyond the commodity). Winston’s observation about
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Julia underscores her mentality: “Any kind of organized revolt against the Party, which was
bound to be a failure, struck her as stupid. The clever thing was to break the rules and stay alive
all the same” (125). Orwell does not show much admiration for such tactics or forms of
rebellion. However, a destituent power lies in performing acts of evasion and reappropriation.
The fetishized revolutionary climax does not have to occur in an ungovernable novel. A riot is
not a revolution but a moment of rupture. The same can be said about breaking the law. No
world has to constitute itself; no one has to win; and no one has to lose—but something must
happen. In the dystopian novel, nothing is allowed to happen. Nonetheless, Orwell’s fiction and
any fiction that develops from his framework cannot make use of such potentials.
In this context, it becomes quite relevant that Kushner was influenced by the works of the
Italian writer Nanni Balestrini to such an extent that she based one of her characters in The
Flamethrowers on his life.25 Balestrini participated in the days of Autonomia and his works drew
inspiration from those experiences. The punchy style she uses when describing the scenes of the
riots is borrowed from his writing style, and Kushner’s work has arguably been one of the key
reasons why his novels have acquired a cult status in the US. Furthermore, Kushner was also
inspired by the collective voices of narration in Balestrini’s work. His two most notable works,
We Want Everything and The Unseen, both focus on collective characters. A collective character
in a novel could be understood as a nameless narrator and protagonist. The individual characters
themselves do not take precedence over the event or what is happening—a fiction of whatever
singularities. In a 2016 interview Kushner did with Balestrini, the latter has the following to say:
We Want Everything is the story of a real person, Alfonso; he told me everything that’s in
the book. He is a collective character, in the sense that in those years, thousands of people

The Italian revolutionary in The Flamethrowers, Gianni, and his scheme of skiing across the border to France are
based directly on Balestrini’s real life events.
25
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like him experienced the same things and had the same ideas and the same behaviors. It’s
for this reason that he has no name in the book. I am interested in collective characters
like the protagonist in The Unseen. I think that unlike what happens in the bourgeois
novel—which is based on the individual and his personal struggle within a society—the
collective character struggles politically, together with others like him, in order to
transform society. Thus his own story becomes an epic story.26
This approach is drastically different from most political novels in the US. The
autonomous movement of workers and students in Italy has helped to shape global contemporary
political struggles. If we are talking of the “future of politics,” this future should draw inspiration
from those same struggles. It is not a coincidence that Kushner began writing The
Flamethrowers shortly after the Occupy Wall Street Movement began in 2011:
As I was writing the book, Autonomia and the Movement of ‘77 started to seem like
something of a cultural zeitgeist. A lot of people were interested in Italy, and that’s partly
because of Occupy and other movements that were going on. Even people in the Arab
movements were looking to Italy, and people in the anti-austerity movements across
Europe. It’s a really interesting time that hasn’t completely been studied and declared
defunct in the way that May ’68 has. The Italian 1970s may have more interesting and
relevant links to the contemporary era, given that the autonomist actions extended beyond
the factory into the cities and were a set of refusals that no longer cohered with the
factory and a traditionally Marxist class composition. Beyond the complicated issue of
Autonomia, there were these rather simple coherences between what I wrote and what

26

See full interview: https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/i-am-interested-in-collective-characters-aninterview-with-nanni-balestrini/.
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was going on in real life. As I wrote about the blackout in 1977, looting was erupting in
London. As I wrote about people being tear-gassed in the streets of Rome that same year,
people were being tear-gassed in Oakland.27
In chapter eighteen of The Flamethrowers, titled “Behind the Green Door,” Kushner describes
the blackout of 1977 in New York City. Kushner demonstrates the same playfulness and displays
of collective power that she depicts in the previous riot scene. This scene enables Kushner to
reveal to the reader connections between revolt and everyday life (there does not have to be a
political demonstration for revolt to emerge). Reno walks out of a theatre during the blackout and
hears a commotion: “Merry Christmas Motherfuckers!” a man shouts as store windows are
shattered (348). Kushner deactivates the law in these scenes, offering no power to the law or
economy. As she describes the short “whoop” of a police siren, she observes that “there was
something impotent about it, that single short whoop” (349). There is no forced morality or
appeal to order as in Orwell’s novels. Instead, she reorients us again to see the intersections
between poor youth in Italy smashing stores and a multi-racial poor smashing various shopping
districts in New York City. Kushner forces readers to reimagine scenes of “chaos” as moments
of spontaneity and the coming-together of the oppressed into an eruption of their power. This
framing of the narrative negates the ill-informed idea that looting is a non-political or senseless
act of destruction. Kushner makes it very clear that this event has purpose as Reno states,
“People knew what they were doing. Like they’d been waiting for the lights to go out” (349).
This description helps the reader accept the existence of events that serve no purpose in
the existing order. The Flamethrowers, presenting us with the potentialities of the ungovernable

27

See full interview: https://www.neworleansreview.org/rachel-kushner-im-not-sure-there-is-a-clear-distinctionbetween-to-communicate-and-to-monologue/.
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novel, breaks the narrative out of the existing order. As Reno reflects on the event, she observes:
“You had to believe in the system, I thought, to feel it was wrong to take things without paying
for them.” Reno offers more commentary to turn this moment in the narrative into something
politically transformative for the reader:
Looting wasn’t stealing, or shopping by other means. It was declaration, one I
understood, watching the juicer crash through the window: the system is in “off” mode.
And in “off” mode, there was no private property, no difference between Burger King
and Alvin’s Television Repair. Everything previously hoarded behind steel glass was up
for grabs. (349)
In both scenes (the riot scene in Italy and the blackout scene in NYC), the proles have the
power. But they are not limited anymore: they have become ungovernable. An ungovernable
novel allows us to attune our imaginations in order to recognize the politics of global revolt and
encounter a shared sense of struggle. The heroism and individualist-humanist identities that have
become so prevalent in literature are relics of a totalitarian imagination. Kushner’s work presents
a challenge to future writers of political fiction. How do we write about the riot and the crowd?
We must first learn to deactivate the novel as an apparatus and reveal the forms of life that exist
as different whatever singularities within them. The separation between writers and
revolutionaries also must be overcome by abolishing these categories and to seek a life in
common (where an economic relationship does not determine form). Lastly, our writing must
give this multiplicity the power to tear down the non-fictional laws imposed on fictional worlds
and the power to inspire new potentialities for our historical moment—to inspire new visions of
life in common. Only then will Orwell’s law imposed on our imagination finally be broken.
Problems between form and content cannot be easily overcome. Yet, relying on Lukács’ and
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Bakhtin’s formulations and contemporary theorizations of ungovernability, we might be able to
reveal a new historical consciousness and a timeless unfinalizablity (in a Bakhtinian sense). Such
an articulation could allow us to reconceive the novel in relation to contemporary revolts as
material conditions continue to change and a collective struggle becomes a necessity. Perhaps,
the ungovernable novel is not a homeless becoming after all but a return to a home called
communism.
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